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Abstract
A new class of attacks against authentication and authenticated key estab-
lishment protocols is described, which we call parsing ambiguity attacks. If
appropriate precautions are not deployed, these attacks apply to a very wide
range of such protocols, including those specied in a number of international
standards. Three example attacks are described in detail, and possible gen-
eralisations are also outlined. Finally, possible countermeasures are given,
as are recommendations for modications to the relevant standards.
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1 Introduction
Over the last four years a number of new attacks have been published on
long-established and apparently stable standardised authenticated key es-
tablishment protocols. The origin of these protocols can be traced back to
the seminal paper of Needham and Schroeder [24], and the protocols con-
cerned had been widely studied and were believed to be secure. Indeed, the
rst edition of the international standard for key establishment mechanisms
using symmetric cryptography, ISO/IEC 11770-2, appeared in 1996 [8], and
no problems were identied until 2004.
However, things have changed in recent years, with the publication of a
number of attacks (including a range of `type attacks') on two standardised
protocols. The attacked protocols (mechanisms 12 and 13 of ISO/IEC 11770-
2) both assume that the two parties who wish to establish a shared secret
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key already share a secret key with a trusted third party (acting as a key
translation centre).
 In 2004 Cheng and Comley [5, 6] described two attacks on mechanism
12 from ISO/IEC 11770-2:1996 [8], one a replay attack and the other
a type attack.
 This caused ISO/IEC SC27, the committee responsible for developing
and maintaining the standard, to issue a corrigendum [14] withdrawing
the mechanism concerned.
 Shortly afterwards, work started within SC27 on a new version of the
standard containing a replacement `xed' version of mechanism 12; the
revised text was published in 2008 [15] as the 2nd edition of ISO/IEC
11770-2.
 In mid 2008, Mathuria and Sriram [19] described new type attacks on
both mechanism 13 and the `xed' version of mechanism 12 proposed
by Cheng and Comley [5, 6]. Whilst the attack on mechanism 13
will need to be addressed by SC27, the attack on the Cheng-Comley
version of mechanism 12 is not an immediate concern; this is because
the version of mechanism 12 contained in [15] is dierent to the Cheng-
Comley x, and is not subject to the Mathuria-Sriram attacks.
The term `type attack' refers to a protocol attack in which protocol
elds of one `type' are misrepresented as being elds of a dierent type.
This typically means that all or part of a message legitimately sent in step
i of a protocol, is misrepresented as a message sent in step j (j 6= i) of a
separate instance of the protocol. For a helpful review of the various types of
attacks possible on authentication and key establishment protocols, see [4].
Before proceeding we note that the Mathuria-Sriram attacks require three
consecutive elds in one protocol message to be misinterpreted as a single
eld in a dierent protocol message. Thus in some ways these attacks are
the rst step towards the much more general class of attacks described in
this paper, since they require the protocol to be used in a domain in which
protocol elds can have varying lengths.
In this paper we show that a wide range of attacks are possible against
almost all the standardised protocols. The attacks we describe are related
to type attacks, but are distinct in that they do not require a message sent
at one step of a protocol to be (mis)used at a distinct protocol step. We
call these attacks parsing ambiguity attacks since they require strings of
data input to cryptographic algorithms to be capable of being interpreted
in more than one way. In some ways they can be regarded as specication
aws rather than aws in the protocols themselves; nevertheless, the same
problem arises in the specications of many protocols.
2
We remark also that, although it is true that some of the protocols we
attack do not have proofs of security (although some do, e.g. mechanism 9
of ISO/IEC 11770-2 [15] is essentially identical to the three party key distri-
bution protocol proved secure by Bellare and Rogaway in [2]), the method
of attack is essentially independent of this fact. That is, these attacks fall
outside the scope of current security proofs, and hence any provably secure
protocol specied in the same way is likely to be subject to the attacks we
describe. This is because protocol security proofs typically do not consider
the possibility of one sequence of data items subjected to a cryptographic
function being misinterpreted as a dierent sequence of data items | that
is, correct/unique parsing is either an implicit or an explicit assumption.
2 Some simple examples
In this section we give three examples of parsing ambiguity attacks to il-
lustrate the general approach. All these attacks apply to well-established
standardised protocols, using a range of cryptographic techniques. We also
discuss how these attacks might be realised in practice. In the next section
we generalise these examples, to show the broad applicability of the attack
technique.
2.1 Specifying authentication and authenticated key estab-
lishment protocols
We start by considering how the protocols of concern to us here are typically
specied. It is this method of specication that gives rise to the possibility
of attacks.
A variety of terminologies have been used to specify authentication and
key establishment protocols. In this paper we use the terminology adopted
in the ISO/IEC 9798 and 11770 series of standards, covering authentication
protocols and key establishment mechanisms respectively. To show the use
of this terminology we give an example of a mechanism from the current
version of ISO/IEC 11770-2 [15], specically mechanism 8. This mechanism
is essentially identical to the basic Kerberos protocol [18, 25] as specied
in [4].
This protocol involves two parties A and B, who wish to share a secret
session key. A and B both share a secret session key with a trusted third
party P , where the key shared by A and P is denoted by KAP and the key
shared by B and P is denoted by KBP . A and B are assumed to know with
whom they are trying to establish a key, and to know what their respective
identiers are.
The mechanism involves the following message ows:
(1): A! P : TVPAjjIB;
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(2): P ! A: eKAP (TVPAjjF jjIBjjText1) jj eKBP (TP =NP jjF jjIAjjText2);
(3): A! B: eKBP (TP =NP jjF jjIAjjText2) jj [eK(TA=NAjjIBjjText3)];
(4): B ! A: [eK(TB=NBjjIAjjText4)].
In this description, X ! Y : Z indicates that entity X sends message Z to
entity Y , IX denotes an identier for entity X (where IX is assumed to be
unique within the domain of application of the protocol), eK^(Z) denotes the
authenticated encryption of data Z using secret key K^ (using an authenti-
cated encryption mode such as EAX [3] or GCM [23] | see also ISO/IEC
19772 [17]), TVPX represents a time variant parameter (TVP) issued by
entity X, i.e. a random number RX , time stamp TX or sequence number
NX , F represents keying material, and Texti (i = 1; 2; : : :) are optional elds
that can be used to carry application-specic data.
All data items within the various messages are (implicitly) assumed to
be bit strings, and jj represents the bit concatenation operator (note that
this assumption about the interpretation of jj is explicitly given in all the
international standards discussed in this paper). Data items shown in square
brackets are optional.
In message (1), A requests keying material from P by sending an iden-
tier IB for B together with a TVP. In (2), P sends A newly generated
keying material F (containing a key K) together with the TVP sent by A
in (1) and an (optional) text eld. Message (2) contains two main parts, i.e.
eKAP (TV PAjjF jjIBjjText1) and eKBP (TP =NP jjF jjIAjjText2). On receipt of
(2), A deciphers the rst part, checks the correctness of the TVP and the
identier IB, and obtains the key K from F . In message (3), A forwards
the second part of message (2) to B, optionally including the second part
[eK(TA=NAjjIBjjText3)], which, if present, enables B to check the integrity
of the key K retrieved from F . On receipt of (3), B deciphers the encrypted
part, checks the correctness of TP or NP and the identier IA, and obtains
the key K from F . Optionally, B sends message (4) to A, thereby acknowl-
edging that it shares the key K with A.
A somewhat distinct terminology is often employed | see, for example,
Boyd and Mathuria [4]. In this terminology, the above protocol would be
specied as follows:
(1): A! P : TVPA; IB;
(2): P ! A: fTVPA; F; IB;Text1gKAP , fTP =NP ; F; IA;Text2gKBP ;
(3): A! B: fTP =NP ; F; IA;Text2gKBP ,[fTA=NA; IB;Text3gK ];
(4): B ! A: [fTB=NB; IA;Text4gK ].
That is, fZgK^ is used to denote the encryption of Z using the key K^, and
the comma functions as a concatenation operator. Although distinct in
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style, the notation has a similar interpretation. Sometimes (as in [4]) the
meaning of the comma is not made explicit, and hence the interpretation
of X;Y could vary anywhere between the simple concatenation of X and
Y to the encoding of elds X and Y using a scheme such as XML or one
of the encoding rules associated with ASN.1. However, in the absence of
specic advice to the contrary, we make the reasonable assumption that
some implementers will interpret the comma as simple concatenation.
2.2 An attack on a key distribution protocol
The rst attack we describe applies to mechanism 8 from ISO/IEC 11770-2
[15], described immediately above. In this attack, party C impersonates
party A (or B) to B (or A) in the key establishment process, as a result of
which B (or A) will possess a secret key which B (or A) believes is shared
with A (or B), but which is, in fact, known to C. We also suppose that C
is a legitimate member of the domain, i.e. it shares a secret key KCP with
P , and has the right to ask P to set up a key with A or B. Three possible
variants of the attack are described, each based on dierent assumptions
about the nature of identier elds, keying material, text elds, and nonces.
We rst note that the protocol specication does not restrict the lengths
of the keying material and identier elds, and we take advantage of this
fact in all three variants of the attack. In all cases we also suppose that C
is able to choose its own identier.
In order to conduct the rst variant of the attack we suppose that C
chooses IC = 0jjIA, i.e. IC is one bit longer than IA. The attack operates
as follows. Here and throughout we write X(Y ) to mean that entity X is
performing an action whilst pretending to be entity Y .
(1): C ! P : TVPC jjIB;
(2): P ! C: eKCP (TVPC jjF jjIBjjText1) jj eKBP (TP =NP jjF jjIC jjText2);
(3): C(A) ! B: eKBP (TP =NP jjF jjIC jjText2) jj [eK(TC(A)=NC(A)jjIBjjText3)];
(4): B ! C(A): [eK(TB=NBjjIAjjText4)].
Observe that messages (1) and (2) are the perfectly legitimate rst two
messages of the protocol, as they would be used by C when wishing to
establish a shared key with B. However, because of the special form of C's
identier, C is able to misuse the encrypted string provided by P in message
(2) in order to impersonate A to B in message (3). To achieve this goal,
at the same time as sending message (3) to B, C asserts to B that it is A,
and that the bit-length of the keying material eld is one greater than the
bit-length of the eld F generated by P .
To see what eect this has, observe that F jjIC = F jj0jjIA = F jjIA,
where F  contains one more bit than F . That is, since B expects the keying
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material eld in message (3) to be of length one greater than the length of F ,
B will decrypt message (3) to obtain TP =NP jjF jjIAjjText2, which will look
exactly as it should. That is, B will believe F  is shared with A whereas it
is actually shared with C.
If changing the length of F is not possible, e.g. because it is xed to a
single value for all members of the domain, then a similar result is possible
by manipulating the length of the Text2 eld. That is, suppose C chooses
his/her identier so that IC = IAjj0. The second attack variant is then
precisely as above, except that C asserts to B that it is A, and that the bit-
length of the Text2 eld is one greater than the bit-length of the eld Text2
generated by P . B will decrypt message (3) to obtain TP =NP jjF jjIAjjText2,
where Text2 = 0jjText2, and will believe it shares F with A, whereas it will
actually share it with C.
Observe that the attack may be simpler to launch in this second case,
since the exact form of the text eld Text2 may not be prescribed by the
application. Indeed, recipients may choose to ignore text elds if they are not
expecting them to contain any useful information. In such a case, varying
the length of this eld may not cause any concern to the recipient.
Next, suppose that the implementation is such that the length of neither
the keying material eld F nor the text elds can be changed. To describe
our third attack variant we observe that the lengths of random nonces used
in the above protocol have not been specied in ISO/IEC 11770-2 [15]. If
a recipient (e.g. entity P ) is prepared to accept varying length nonces, then
a variant of the attack is still possible. For example, suppose the attacker
C chooses as its identier IC = 0jjIB for one of the victims B. The attack
operates as follows.
(1): A! C(P ): RAjjIB;
(1'): C(A) ! P : R0AjjIC ;
(2): P ! A: eKAP (R0AjjF jjIC jjText1) jj eKCP (TP =NP jjF jjIAjjText2);
(3): A! C(B): eKCP (TP =NP jjF jjIAjjText2) jj [eK(TA=NAjjIBjjText3)];
(4): C(B) ! A: [eK(TC(B)=NC(B)jjIAjjText4)].
C rst intercepts message (1) from A to P , and prevents it from reaching
P . C next removes the last bit of RA to obtain R
0
A, i.e. RA = R
0
Ajjx, for
some bit x. C (masquerading as A) then sends message (10) to P to persuade
P that A wants to set up a key with C. Note that message (10) is equal
to R0Ajj0jjIB. Message (2) is the legitimate message from P to A. After
decrypting the rst part of the message, A obtains R0AjjF jjIC jjText1, and
interprets it as (R0Ajjy)jj(F 0jj0)jjIBjjText1, where F = yjjF 0 for some bit y.
If y = x (which holds with probability 1/2), A will accept F  = F 0jj0 as
valid keying material, which A believes to be shared with B; otherwise A
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will reject the message and possibly restart the protocol. If the rst part of
message (2) is accepted, A will forward the second part to C (impersonating
B) in message (3). Obviously, C is able to decrypt the rst part to obtain F .
Observe that the two data items in square brackets are perfectly legitimate
parts of the protocol, and will not help A to detect the attack.
Note that essentially the same attack works on mechanism 9 of ISO/IEC
11770-2 [15] in an even more powerful way. In this case, by manipulating
the nonce RA and its identier IC , the attacker C can impersonate B to A;
by manipulating the nonce RB and its identier IC , the attacker C can also
impersonate A to B.
Note also that the above attacks can be generalised to cover the cases
where either (a) the identier of IC is a number of bits longer than IA (or
IB), and/or IC is slightly shorter than IA (or IB). In summary, if C can
choose its own identier, and C is allowed to `modify' the length of any of
F , Text2 or RA, C can successfully attack the protocol.
2.3 A parsing-based reection attack
The next attack we describe applies to a somewhat simpler protocol, namely
the one-pass authentication mechanism of ISO/IEC 9798-2 [12]. It works
on the assumption that A and B already share a long-term secret key KAB,
and that they wish to use this to provide (unilateral) authentication of A to
B. The mechanism involves the following single message ow:
(1): A! B: eKAB (TA=NAjjIBjjText1).
In message (1), A sends B either a time stamp TA or a sequence number
NA, the identier IB, and an optional text eld Text1. The data elds are
encrypted using the key KAB, where, as previously, use of an authenticated
encryption mechanism is assumed. On receipt of the message, B deciphers
the encrypted part and checks IB and the time stamp or sequence number.
If the checks succeed, B deems A to have been authenticated.
As a result of the attack, C manages to persuade B that it has authen-
ticated A, whereas B is actually communicating with C. The attack has
similarities to the reection attack described in [20]. In order to make the
attack work, we suppose that B has been issued with an identier IB with
the property that IA = IBjjx, where x is a short bit-string. We also suppose
that time-stamps are used, and not sequence numbers.
C starts by impersonating A to B. When B asks C for an authentication
message, C immediately starts a second communications session with B
again pretending to be A, this time asking B to authenticate itself to A.
Following the protocol above, B will send C the following:
eKAB (TBjjIAjjText1):
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Now, since IA = IBjjx, we know that IAjjText1 = IBjjText1, where Text1 =
xjjText1.
On receipt of the above message from B, C immediately sends precisely
the same message back to B as the response to B's initial request for au-
thentication. When B decrypts it, B will obtain the string TBjjIBjjText1.
Assuming that the message is `reected' back to B quickly enough, B will
accept TB as current, and will also recognise IB. As long as the optional
data eld Text1 is also acceptable (and whether or not this is true will be
very much application specic), B will accept the message as having come
from A, and will therefore have (falsely) veried the presence of A.
An almost identical attack applies to the corresponding MAC-based pro-
tocol from ISO/IEC 9798-4 [11]. This protocol involves the following single
message:
(1): A! B: TA=NAjjText2jjfKAB (TA=NAjjIBjjText1).
where f is a MAC function (such as a CBC-MAC [10] or HMAC [13]), and
other notation is as above.
In this case the attack may actually be easier to launch, as the data
string used to compute the MAC is reassembled by the recipient from the
information provided by the sender (as opposed to being recovered as the
result of a decryption operation). That is, the issue is not whether or not
the recipient can be persuaded to parse a decrypted string incorrectly, but
whether or not the recipient can be persuaded that a certain sequence of data
elds, as provided in cleartext by the sender, are a valid sequence of data
elds. In this latter case it seems reasonable to suppose that the recipient
could be exible about the lengths of some of the elds involved.
2.4 An attack on a signature-based authentication protocol
Our third example attack applies to an authentication protocol based on
the use of digital signatures, namely the two-pass mutual authentication
protocol from ISO/IEC 9798-3 [9]. This protocol has the following two
message ows:
(1): A! B: TA=NAjjIBjjText2jjsA(TA=NAjjIBjjText1);
(2): B ! A: TB=NBjjIAjjText4jjsB(TB=NBjjIAjjText3).
In this description, sX denotes the signature function of entity X, and other
notation is as above. Note that if necessary, one or both messages can
include a copy of the certicate for the sender's signature verication public
key. Note also that Text2 must contain sucient information to enable B to
construct Text1 | a typical case would be to put Text2 = Text1, and this
is what we assume below (precisely corresponding remarks apply to Text3
and Text4).
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One possible attack on this scheme operates as follows. We suppose that
the domain within which the protocol is used employs timestamps rather
than sequence numbers. Entity C (which must be a legitimate party) reg-
isters an identier IC = IBjjx for some (short) bit-string x. C now initiates
an instance of the above protocol with A using identity IC , so that we have:
(1): C ! A: TC jjIAjjText1jjsC(TC jjIAjjText1);
(2): A! C: TAjjIC jjText3jjsA(TAjjIC jjText3).
C now re-uses an unchanged copy of message (2) to initiate a second
instance of the protocol with B, this time impersonating A. B then responds
in the expected way. That is we have:
(1): C(A) ! B: TAjjIBjjText3jjsA(TAjjIBjjText3);
(2): B ! C(A): TBjjIAjjText03jjsB(TBjjIAjjText03);
where Text3 = xjjText3. This works because IC jjText3 = IBjjxjjText3 =
IBjjText3. Thus the attack will be successful if B accepts Text3 = xjjText3
as a valid text eld.
This is an attack since A believes it has completed a mutual authentica-
tion with C, whereas B believes it has conducted a mutual authentication
with A.
2.5 Realising the attacks
We now describe possible ways in which the attacks might be realised in
practice; that is we describe why they are a genuine threat (at least in some
application scenarios).
First observe that all the above attacks require at least two of the proto-
col message elds to be of variable length. We now consider some examples
of cases where this might be a reasonable assumption. We consider each
type of message eld in turn.
 Keying material elds F : In some cases, more than one type of key
might be distributed within a domain. In such a case, the keys involved
may be of varying length.
 Identier elds IX : In practice, whilst many types of identier have
xed length, there are examples of identiers which do not have this
property. Examples of widely used identiers of varying length include
email addresses and URLs.
 Optional text elds Texti: The nature of these elds will be application
dependent, and it seems reasonable to assume that in some applica-
tions these can be of variable length.
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 Nonces RX : Nonces are used to prevent replay or interleaving attacks.
For this purpose, a nonce must be unpredictable and non-repeating
with a high probability. Given that there may be varying assessments
of what is a suitably high probability, users may choose varying lengths
for nonces.
We also require that it is possible for two identiers (IA, IB for parties
A and B, say) to have the property that IA = xjjIB, for some x. Depending
on the nature of the attack, we either require it to be possible for A:
 given IB, to choose IA such that IA = xjjIB (or IA = IBjjx), or
 to nd a pair of entities A and B with the property that IA = xjjIB.
Email addresses can satisfy both these properties. In the rst case, it may
be relatively straightforward to register an email address which has another
(specied) email address as a substring. For example, suppose B has email
address b.smith@rhul.ac.uk. Then A could register the email address
bob.smith@rhul.ac.uk, i.e. IA = bojjIB.
The second case can arise commonly, e.g. in an organisation where the
rst part of the address is a name. The example given above could easily
arise by chance. Indeed, we expect that there will be several examples of
such pairs of addresses in any large organisation which allows email addresses
to be based on the names of individuals.
3 Widening the attack scope
In section 2 we described three examples of `parsing attacks' against a range
of dierent types of authentication and authenticated key establishment
protocols. In fact, it would seem possible to launch similar attacks against
almost any authentication or authenticated key establishment protocol, at
least if they are specied in the style given above. Of course, if the lengths
of all the elds are xed throughout the domain of use then the attacks
are prevented, but the imposition of such a requirement is rare | also, it
is simply not appropriate to make such a requirement for certain types of
identier (as discussed above).
To see how the more general classes of attack apply, we make the follow-
ing observations.
 The approach used in the attack described in section 2.2 can also be
applied to attack any of the seven third-party-based authenticated
key establishment mechanisms in ISO/IEC 11770-2:2008 [15], includ-
ing both Key Distribution Centre and Key Translation Centre based
mechanisms. The attack approach also applies to the two third-party-
based authentication protocols given in ISO/IEC 9798-2 [12].
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 The reection attack described in section 2.3 also applies to other
standardised authentication protocols based on symmetric cryptog-
raphy, including both those based on nonces (i.e. challenge-response
protocols) as well as protocols providing mutual authentication of two
parties. That is, the attack applies to the majority of the protocols
specied in ISO/IEC 9798-2 [12] and ISO/IEC 9798-4 [11].
 The attack described in section 2.4 could be generalised in a number of
ways. For example, as noted above, the lengths of random nonces used
in some standardised protocols have not been specied. In protocols
using nonces, the nonce elds could also be used to `swap' identiers.
For example, adopting such an approach, the three pass authentication
mechanism in ISO/IEC 9798-3 [9] can be attacked in a similar way to
the attack given in section 2.4.
 Additional problems of the same general type can arise with the public
key based key establishment mechanisms specied in ISO/IEC 11770-3
[16], when identity-based mechanism are used. For example, in public
key transport mechanism 1 of ISO/IEC 11770-3, PKIAjjText is dis-
tributed over an authentic channel, where PKIA contains the public
key of entity A. If an application is using identity-based cryptogra-
phy, PKIA will contain an identity-based public key, which includes
the public key of a key generation centre (KGC) and an identier IA
for A. Now suppose that an attacker C registers with the same KGC
as A, and uses an identier IC which includes IA as a substring. In
such a case, it may be possible for C to persuade the recipient of
PKIAjjText to incorrectly parse it. When this happens, the recipient
will accept the identity IA with a public key for which C knows the
corresponding private key.
 Finally observe that two of the protocols given in ISO/IEC 9798-3 have
also been adopted in NIST FIPS Pub. 196 [22]. Exactly corresponding
notation and assumptions have been used in the NIST document, and
hence the attacks applying to the ISO/IEC protocols also apply to the
protocols in this standard.
In conclusion, we observe that the attacks we have described are probably
just the tip of an iceberg. We certainly do not believe that we have discovered
all the possible classes of attack that can arise because of ambiguities in the
interpretation of cryptographically-protected data strings.
4 Fixing the problem
It should be clear that the origin of all the problems we have described is
the possible false interpretation of a cryptographically protected string. We
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have identied two main types of `parsing error':
1. where the attacker persuades the recipient of an encrypted string to
parse the decrypted string incorrectly;
2. where the attacker persuades the recipient of a MAC (or signature) to
believe that the MAC (or signature) has been computed on a string
made up of the combination of a series of data elds which dier from
those used to compute the MAC (or signature).
Observe that these two types of problem are very general, and have
been studied in a variety of dierent contexts. That is, the problems we
have identied here might arise in contexts other than authentication or key
establishment; issues arising from situations in which a signer is required to
sign data strings provided by other (potentially malicious) parties have been
explored previously in [21]. Also, if a malicious party A could manage to
have his/her signature sA(m1jjm2) interpreted as sA(m3jjm4), he/she might
be able to escape from a non-repudiation commitment.
Problems of these two types can be avoided if the parties in any domain
agree in advance on a way of:
1. composing data strings that are to be encrypted in such a way that
they can be parsed unambiguously;
2. combining data strings to generate a bit string prior to computing
a MAC (or signature) in such a way that only precisely the same
sequence of data strings can yield the bit string.
This could be achieved in a variety of dierent ways. For example, both
properties could be guaranteed by:
 xing the lengths of each of the substrings throughout the domain (this
would mean that inherently variable length identiers such as email
addresses would need to be padded to a pre-agreed xed length);
 encoding each substring in a way that guarantees uniqueness, e.g. using
a tag-length-value format or XML.
It is interesting to note that, in two of the key papers establishing the
`provable security' approach to authentication and authenticated key estab-
lishment protocols, Bellare and Rogaway [1, 2] carefully specied `a random
k-bit challenge' for a nonce and `k-bit names of the players' for identities. It
would seem likely that, without xing the length of each parameter, mech-
anisms such as those attacked here cannot be proved secure. We next give
an example to demonstrate this.
As stated before, the three party key distribution protocol proposed in [2]
is essentially identical to mechanism 9 of ISO/IEC 11770-2 [15]. The security
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of this protocol was proved in [2] in the security model proposed in the same
paper. We now remove the condition that both the nonces and identiers
are of k bits, and allow an attacker C to manipulate their lengths. Suppose
C is able to persuade the key distribution server S to accept dierent lengths
for RA and IC . By following the same approach as described in Section 2.2,
C removes the rst bit (x, say) of RA to obtain R
0
A, and arranges for its
identier IC to be IC = IBjjx. Since IBjjRA = IC jjR0A, C can successfully
impersonate party B to party A.
We now attempt to verify the security of this slightly modied protocol
in the security model presented in [2], where the details of the model are
given in [2]. C is able to share the established key with A but C is not the
partner of A, since A is attempting to share the key with B. An adversary
in the security model with the goal of breaking this protocol can take an
oracle sA;B, which models an instance s of party A attempting to agree a
shared session key with party B, as a Test oracle, and then make a Reveal
query to another oracle tC;A, which similarly models an instance t of party
C attempting to agree a key with party A. Because C is not A's partner, the
session key held by C should be revealed to the adversary. So the adversary
can easily win the game that species the model, and the protocol is therefore
not secure in this model.
Another possible approach to addressing the identied problems would
be to replace IX with h(IX) in every cryptographically protected string for
every identier IX , where h is a cryptographic hash function. This would
help to prevent any attacks where one identier is confused for another.
Finally, where possible it may also be prudent to add message identiers
to each cryptographically data string, as has been done for mechanism 12
in the latest edition of ISO/IEC 11770-2 [15]. Whilst this does not directly
relate to the attacks described here, it prevents attacks where one message
of a protocol is abused as a dierent message of the same protocol.
5 Implications for protocol standards
The implications for the ISO/IEC standards covering authentication and
authenticated key establishment appear to be clear. The current specica-
tions are not sucient to ensure that every implementer of the standards will
produce a secure scheme. That is, additional guidance needs to be provided
to users of the standards on the construction and interpretation of cryp-
tographically protected data strings. To avoid problems we cannot detect
right now, it would be a good idea to requirements along the lines of those
given in the previous section to all parts of ISO/IEC 9798 and ISO/IEC
11770.
Finally, although the main focus of this paper has been on protocols
specied in international standards, similar problems arise in many places
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that protocols are specied. This includes academic papers and books, such
as that of Boyd and Mathuria [4]. All users of authentication and authen-
ticated key establishment protocols should be aware of the possible issues
arising from parsing ambiguities.
6 Concluding remarks
From a general perspective, the problems identied here are just one exam-
ple of issues that can arise when translating theory into practice. Theorems
about protocols (e.g. established using one of many logic-based approaches
or the `provable security' techniques) are built upon important assumptions
without which the proofs do not hold. These assumptions may be explicit
(as in the assumptions about xed-length strings made by Bellare and Ro-
gaway), or implicit (as in some of the logic-based approaches, where the
unique division of an encrypted string into sub-elds is assumed).
This highlights the importance of correctly bridging the gap between
theory and practice. We conclude by observing that the attacks described
here are by no means the only examples of attacks of this general type |
see, for example, the recent work of Degabriele and Paterson [7] on attacking
IPsec used in encryption-only congurations.
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